Abstract-In this paper, we propose a robust and efficient signature scheme for Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communications, called Binary Authentication Tree (BAT). The BAT scheme can effectively eliminate the performance bottleneck when verifying a mass of signatures within a rigorously required interval, even under adverse scenarios with bogus messages. Given any n received messages with k ≥ 1 bogus ones, the computation cost to verify all these messages only requires approximately (k + 1) · log(n/k) + 4k − 2 time-consuming pairing operations. The BAT scheme can also be gracefully transplanted to other similar batch signature schemes. In addition, it offers the other conventional security for vehicular networks, such as identity privacy and traceability. Theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate the validity and practicality of the BAT scheme.
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I. INTRODUCTION
V EHICULAR Ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have attracted extensive attentions in recent years for their promises in revolutionizing the human driving modes and transportation systems. VANETs consist of network entities, including vehicles and road-side infrastructure units (RSUs). Vehicle-toVehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are two basic vehicular communication modes, which allow vehicles to communicate with each other or with the roadside infrastructure, respectively. Vehicular communication over the wireless medium employs the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) protocol [1] .
The security and privacy in VANETs face many challenges due to the open broadcasting of wireless communications and the high-speed mobility of the vehicles. It is obvious that any malicious behaviors of user, such as injecting beacons with false information, modifying and replaying the disseminated messages, could be fatal to the other users. Furthermore, privacy must be achieved in the sense that the vehicle related privacy information should be protected so that an attacker can be prevented from collecting vehicle messages, tracking locations, and inferring sensitive data. Meanwhile, the authorities should be able to trace the identities of message senders for any traffic dispute. Hence, to satisfy above security requirements, it is prerequisite to develop a suite of elaborate protocols to achieve security, privacy, and efficient message authentication before vehicular networks can be practically deployed.
A vehicular network needs strong authentication, because it is desirable to validate each message sent by the On Board Units (OBUs). A well-recognized solution is to sign each message with a signature [31] . However, classic signature schemes that sequentially verify the messages may fail to satisfy the real-time requirement in vehicular communications. According to DSRC protocol [1] , a RSU may communicate with hundreds of OBUs and each OBU will periodically transmit a safety or traffic message (beacon) to the nearest RSU via a common DSRC channel. Beaconing rate ρ typically ranges from 3 to 10 beacons per second, with ρ = 10 currently considered as necessary for safety applications. Therefore, even in a normal traffic scenario, it is a very rigorous requirement for any RSU using classic signature schemes to verify a mass of messages in real-time. The delay caused by verifying a bulk of signatures may radically impede transmission throughput and impair the system scalability. Recently, an efficient batch verification scheme for optimizing the verification performance in V2I communications without any bogus messages has been proposed [24] . A prerequisite condition in this method is that all the signatures should be authentic.
To address the aforesaid security and performance issues, we introduce a robust and efficient signature scheme, called BAT (Binary Authentication Tree), for V2I communications, which features the following notable properties.
• Robustness: The BAT scheme is competent for adverse attack scenarios with bogus messages, since each RSU can quickly distinguish the bogus messages from all the authentic ones. Therefore, our BAT scheme can efficiently tolerate, to a large extent, message flooding attacks.
• Efficiency: The BAT scheme efficiently eliminates the performance bottleneck due to the significantly reduced computational overhead. To verify any n received messages with k ≥ 1 bogus ones, the number of timeconsuming pairing operations is approximately equal to (k + 1) · log(n/k) + 4k − 2. In ideal case (k = 0), the computation overhead to verify all the messages can be remarkably reduced from 2n time-consuming pairing operations to 2.
Therefore, the BAT scheme can meet the security and efficiency requirements for Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communications with low message transmission overhead, identity privacy, and traceability. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed BAT scheme is the first one to include evaluated theoretical boundaries of verification complexity for the batch verification of identity-based signatures under adverse attacks, which can be used to guide the balance between security and performance. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the related works are discussed. In Section III, preliminaries related to the proposed research are given, including the application model and the pairing concept. In Section IV, the proposed BAT signature scheme is introduced in details. In Section V, the performance evaluation and security analysis are presented, followed by the conclusions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS Spontaneous vehicular communications are very important research area [2] , [3] , [4] . Message authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, as well as privacy preservation are identified as primary requirements. To address such issues in VANETs, Zarki et al. [5] and Duri et al. [6] independently present a secure architecture for vehicular networks. Mobile communications also introduce a location privacy issue, which is defined as an identity not being associated with user's location. In [7] , the mix zone method is introduced to ensure location privacy, and to assess privacy using information theory. Other approaches to address location privacy, such as CARAVAN [8] , disposable interface identifiers [9] , blind signature [10] , [11] and silent period [12] , are also proposed to de-correlate identities to the locations. J. -P. Hubaux et al. [13] further identify the specific issues of security and privacy challenges in VANETs, and claim that a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) should be well deployed to protect the transited messages and to mutually authenticate among network entities. Raya et al. [14] also propose a PKI-based security and privacy protocol, where each vehicle needs to pre-load a huge pool of anonymous public/private keys, and the trusted authority also needs to store all the anonymous certificates of all the vehicles, which incurs inefficiency for certificate management. In [15] , an approach to implement privacy in VANETs is presented by using geo-bounded pseudonyms and a trustedthird party. Another PKI-based architecture for authentication and authorization is proposed using the Kerberos model by Moustafa et al. [16] . Recently, Lin et al. [17] , based on the group signature [23] , advise a security protocol, which offers a perfect traceability. However, since verifying each signature needs at least two cost-consuming pairing operations, the scalability may be an issue with the increased number of signatures. Aimed at optimizing the communication overhead, Raya et al. [18] propose a secure traffic aggregation scheme, which can notably reduce the overhead for Vehicle-to-Vehicle communications. E. Schoch et al. [19] examine the impact of changeable pseudonyms on geographic-based ad hoc routing. They indicate that frequently changing identifiers has detrimental effects on routing efficiency and increases packet loss rate, and thus designing VANET systems should balance the tradeoff between privacy protection and route performance. Another important issue is verification performance. According to the DSRC protocol, since a RSU may receive a large amount of messages within a short interval, it is very rigid for any RSU to authenticate all these messages in real-time. A possible promising approach to improve the verification efficiency is to employ the batch verification [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , since it could quickly verify a large number of signatures simultaneously instead of sequentially by decreasing the number of some principal time-consuming operations, especially when authenticating a large number of signatures. These methods assume that all the verified signatures are authentic, and therefore, they need to be optimized for realistic applications, where bogus signatures commonly exist. In [29] , J. Pastuszak et al. attempt to address the problem of bogus signature identification in batch verification of RSA-based digital signatures. However, the boundary of computation complexity is not evaluated in general scenarios with any number of bogus signatures in batch.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first give the description of the application scenario model, followed by the introduction of identity-based cryptography and the bilinear pairings, which are the foundation of the proposed BAT scheme. The notations throughout this paper are listed in Table I .
A. Application Scenario Model
As shown in Fig. 1 such as location, traffic accidents, and other important information from RSUs, and making further analysis and giving response to RSUs.
5) VRS (Vehicle Registration Site).
A RSU may communicate with hundreds of OBUs at the same time within its communication range, which relies on the DSRC broadcast protocol, the designated protocol for vehicular networks [1] . Each vehicle uses its private keys to sign messages and then sends them to its neighboring RSU, while each RSU is in charge of authenticating the received messages.
B. Identity-based Cryptography & Bilinear Pairing
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) is a type of public-key cryptography in which the public key of a user is his or her unique identity information. The primary IBC schemes include Boneh et al.'s pairing-based scheme [20] , Cocks's quadraticresidue based scheme [34] , etc. As an important IBC scheme, the pairing-based IBC scheme can offer lower transmission cost compared with the traditional RSA-based schemes due to the smaller signature overhead. We briefly introduce the bilinear pairing as follows.
Let G and G T respectively be a cyclic additive group and a cyclic multiplicative group generated by P with the same prime order q, i.e., |G| = |G T | = q. Letê : G × G T → G T be a bilinear map, which satisfies the following properties:
there is an efficient algorithm to calculateê(P, Q). Such a bilinear mapê can be constructed by the modified Weil [20] or Tate pairings [21] on elliptic curves. A group with such a mapê is called the bilinear group, on which the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is assumed hard while the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy to be solved [22] . For instance, given unknown a, b, c ∈ Z P and P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G, it is recognized that there exists an efficient algorithm to determine whether ab = c mod q by verifyingê(aP, bP ) =ê(P, cP ) in polynomial time (DDH problem), while there exist no efficient algorithms to compute abP ∈ G with non-negligible probability within polynomial time (CDH problem).
IV. ROBUST SIGNATURE SCHEME USING BINARY AUTHENTICATION TREE
As shown in Fig. 1 , once a RSU receives a message from a vehicle, it authenticates this message to ensure that no adversary is attempting to propagate bogus messages. In this section, based on a new data structure called BAT, we propose a robust and efficient signature scheme for vehicular communications. For clarity, we first introduce our basic signature scheme.
A. Basic Signature Scheme
The proposed basic scheme adopts Hess's signature scheme [32] as the underlying building basis, which is based on identity-based cryptography [20] . It mainly consists of four algorithms: setup, extract, sign and verify. And there are three parties in the system: the TA, the vehicle (signer), the RSU (verifier).
Setup: TA needs to set up the following basic parameters. 1) Bilinear map parameters: Let G and G T be a cyclic additive group and a cyclic multiplicative group, where G and G T are generated by P with the same order q.
is a MapToPoint hash function [22] , and h(.) is a one-way hash function such as MD5 [30] .
2) The TA randomly picks s ∈ Z * q as its secret master key, and computes P P ub = sP as its public keys. Extract: This algorithm is performed by the TA. Prior to the vehicular system deployment of each RSU and vehicle, the TA sets up the related parameters for them. The RSU is preloaded with the public parameters {G, G T , q, P, P P ub }, while each vehicle obtains its system parameters as follows.
1) When a legitimate vehicle V i registers with the TA, it submits its unique identity ID i to the TA. 2) The TA picks a secret random number w ∈ Z * q and a group of secret random numbers
, ..., g vi,z } respectively, and then computes a group of pseudo identities P ID *
where "⊕" denotes bitwise XOR operation. The secret
Thus, the real identity ID i of vehicle V i is hidden in the pseudo identities P ID * i . In addition, the TA uses the pseudo identities in P ID * i to derive the corresponding signature keys
3) Finally, the TA delivers the related security parameters {G, 
where 
since it can be proofed as follows:
Clearly, the computation cost to verify a signature primarily consists of one multiplication and two pairing operations, where the MapToPoint hash operation is avoided since H(P ID i ) is listed in message M i . Compared with multiplication operation, the computation cost of a pairing operation is much higher.
B. Binary Authentication Algorithm
In DSRC protocol, a RSU may verify a large number of signatures within a rigorous interval. From Eq. (5), due to the time-consuming pairing operation, verifying the messages sequentially will result in a performance bottleneck for each RSU and impair the system scalability. We introduce an alternative verifying algorithm to address the efficiency and robustness, based on the following novel BAT data structure.
BAT: Without loss of generality, assume that there are n = 2 h vehicles {V 1 , V 2 , ..., V n } and the corresponding signatures are {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n }. Then we can construct a Binary Authentication Tree as follows:
1) Each leaf-node h, v in BAT is associated with the
is associated with an aggregate signature α l,v = {α k1 , α k1+1 , ..., α k2 } of all the signatures in the leaf nodes of the sub-tree rooted at l, v , where The root node is an aggregate signature   <1,0>   <0,0>   <2,1>  <2,0>   <1,1>   <2,3>  <2,2>   <3,1>  <3,0>  <3,3>  <3,2>  <3,7>  <3,6>  <3, = {α 1 , α 2 , . .., α n } associated to all signatures at the leaf-nodes. For instance, as shown in Fig. 2, leaf 
A node l, v is associated with an aggregate signature α l,v = {α k1 , α k1+1 , ..., α k2 } of all the signatures in the leaf nodes of the sub-tree rooted at l, v , where 
This groupbased verification equation is held, since it can be proofed with the following derivation steps:
Thus, the group-based authentication can noticeably reduce the computation cost, especially when verifying a large number of aggregate signatures. From the above Eq. (7), the computation cost to verify k signatures mainly consists of k multiplication, k one-way hash, and 2 pairing operations.
Binary Authentication Algorithm: Based on the BAT, we introduce a novel Up-to-Bottom binary verifying algorithm, which can significantly reduce the verifying complexity, even if there are some bogus signatures. Unlike in binary search tree, which is to find a specific value in a sorted list, the aim of binary authentication tree is to find the bogus signatures in these signatures {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n }. Searching a binary authentication tree is a process that recursively verifies the sub-tree dictated by the current authentication status. We begin with authenticating the aggregate signature α 0,0 of root node 0, 0 . If the aggregate signature α 0,0 is genuine, this shows that all the signatures in the leaf-nodes are authentic. Otherwise, we further recursively verify the aggregate signatures of the left-child node α 1,0 or right nodes α 1,1 in the same manner, respectively. Finally, if we reach a leaf node h, v and this node is associated with a bogus signature, we list it in the bogus signature set as F S = F S α h,v , which indicates that the signature α v+1 sent by the vehicle V v+1 is a bogus message.
Algorithm 1
In the binary authentication, the computation cost for a RSU to check n signatures primarily consists of n multiplication, n one-way hash, and some pairing operations. The number of pairing operations relies on the number of the bogus signatures k. The BAT scheme can radically reduce the verification delay, mostly when verifying signatures mixed with k bogus signatures. Especially, if k = 0, the computation cost to verify multiple signatures is constant regardless of the size of the group. Hence, the potential performance bottleneck of verifying a large number of signatures at the RSU is alleviated, and the message loss ratio is remarkably reduced.
V. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY EVALUATIONS
In this section, we formulate the computation complexity of the BAT scheme, and then evaluate its performance in terms of verification delay by simulation, followed by the security analysis. We assume all the vehicles can communicate directly with the RSU.
A. Algorithm Complexity
Without loss of generality, let that RSU receive n = 2 h messages {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n } with k fake signatures. To distinguish the k fake messages from these n messages, RSU need execute algorithm Binary_Auth(α 0,0 , F S), where the set FS is assigned to null in the initial phase, i.e.,F S = [ ].
The computation cost of Fast_Check(α 0,0 ) is dominantly comprised of n multiplication, n one-way hash, and 2 pairing operations. In fact, except for pairing operations, all other operations can be pre-calculated and stored during the execution of Fast_Check(α 0,0 ) to avoid on-the-fly computation in the later sub-tree verification. Hence, to evaluate the computation overhead, we only focus on the computation complexity of the time-consuming pairing operations in BAT. LetC(l, t) denote the average number of paring operations when a RSU performs binary authentication for a BAT tree/sub-tree with height l and t bogus signatures in its leaf node.
Lemma 1: For a BAT sub-tree with height l + 1 and t (t ≤ k) forged signatures in its leaf nodes,C(l + 1, t) can be recursively calculated as follows.
1) t ≤ 2 l :C(l + 1, t) can be recursively calculated as
Based on the Lemma 1, we introduce the following Lemma to evaluate the verification complexity of a BAT tree, which is associated with any n signatures {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n } of vehicles {V 1 , V 2 , ..., V n }, including k bogus signatures in them.
Lemma 2: Given a binary authentication tree with n leaf nodes which are respectively associated with the signatures {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n } of vehicles {V 1 , V 2 , ..., V n }, the average number of pairing operations,C(h, k) , in binary authentication algorithm can be computed as
where h ≥ log k and the following boundary conditions hold
To evaluate the complexity ofC(h, k), we introduce the following Lemma to depict its upper and lower boundaries.
Lemma 3: Given the two sequences derived from Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), respectively,
Intuitively, given k bogus signatures, if they are uniformly distributed in the leaf nodes, the number of pairing operations is maximized. If they are distributed in an aggregate way, the number of pairing operations is minimized.
Lemma 4: Given the inequality in Lemma 3, the computation complexityC(h, k) (k ≥ 1) in binary authentication algorithm has the following upper and lower boundaries:
As an approximate evaluation, we can consider that C(h, k) (k ≥ 1) is equal to the average of the above upper and lower boundaries: {α 1 , α 2 , . .., α n } and k forged signatures among them:
Lemma 5: (Best & Worse Cases) Given a binary authentication tree with n signatures
1) The best computation complexity of pairing operations in authentication algorithm is 2) The worst computation complexity of pairing operations in authentication algorithm is
B. Performance Comparisons
We compare the BAT scheme with both the ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) scheme [33] and the basic scheme in terms of the verification complexity. The ECDSA scheme is the signature algorithm advised by IEEE1069.2 standard [31] , which is the current standard for VANETs, while the basic signature scheme was introduced in Section IV, which is the basis of the BAT signature scheme.
ECDSA, as a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), operates on elliptic curve groups. With elliptic curve cryptography, the bit size of the public key in ECDSA is about twice the size of the security level measured in bits. To achieve security level of 80 bits, a DSA public key is at least 1024 bits, whereas an ECDSA public key is 160 bits. In addition, the signature size of both DSA and ECDSA is equal to 4t bits, where t is the security level, that is, about 320 bits for security level of 80 bits.
We define computation cost of the cryptographic operations as follows. Let Cmul denote the time cost to perform one point multiplication over an elliptic curve, and Cpar the time of a pairing operation. Since these operations dominate the verifying overhead, we neglect all the other light-weight operations such as one-way hash function. Note that the computation cost of MapToPoint hash operations in Eq. (7) is avoided since H(P ID i ) is included in message M i . Table II gives the comparison for the three signature schemes in terms of verifying n authentic single and n signatures with k bogus signatures, respectively. It can be seen that BAT has the lowest computation complexity on the average when the number of bogus messages is not extremely large. Specifically, if there is no bogus message (k = 0), the computation overhead to verify all these n messages can be remarkably reduced from 2n time-consuming pairing operations to 2.
As far as verifying n authentic signatures is concerned, BAT needs 2C par + nC mul , whereas the basic scheme requires 2(n+1)C par and ECDSA takes 4nC mul . In addition, to verify n signatures with k bogus ones, the basic scheme requires 2(n + 1)C par and ECDSA involves 4nC mul , whereas BAT approximately needs ((k+1)·log(n/k)+4k−2)C par +nC mul on the average according to Lemma 4 and Eq. (16) . Note that since ECDSA is not an identity-based signature scheme, extra operations are needed to verify the public key certificate. Thus, the overall message verification time for ECDSA should be larger. Next, we compare the verification cost of the above three schemes. Let each vehicle periodically transmits a message to the nearest RSU with beaconing rates ?=3 per second. In addition, we implement a super singular curve of embedded degree k = 6 over F 3 97 with C program on Intel Core T M 2 Duo 2.0GHz Linux machine. The resultant benchmark values are: C mul = 0.49ms and C par = 1.87ms. According to the simulation, the verification cost of BAT is approximately equal to that of ECDSA (k/n ≈ 13%) and the basic scheme (k/n ≈ 27%) for n ≤ 640. From Fig. 3 , it can be seen that for n ≤ 640: 1) if k/n < 13%, BAT has the lowest cost among all three schemes; 2) if 13% < k/n < 27%, BAT excels the basic scheme in performance while it is inferior to ECDSA scheme; 3) if k/n ≥ 27%, the performance of BAT is inferior to the other two ones. Therefore, the BAT scheme is competent for the non-severe attack scenarios, where the bogus message ratio k/n is less than 27%. Especially, consider the ideal case (k/n = 0), compared with ECDSA and the basic scheme, BAT exhibits more than 70% and 80% reduction in verifying cost, respectively.
Assume that each OBU periodically transmits a safety or traffic message to the nearest RSU, at the rate ρ = 3, Table  III shows the maximum number of verified signatures under such constraint in BAT scheme, whereas for the basic scheme and ECDSA scheme, the maximum number of signatures that can be verified by a RSU is 90 and 151, respectively.
Intuitively, when the number of bogus messages increases, the BAT algorithm need traverse more nodes in the binary authentication tree, where the verification cost for checking each node involves two pairing operations (Algorithm 1, Lines 4). Fig. 4 shows the verification cost of BAT with the variance of the number of bogus messages (k), for different number of messages (n). Considering the maximal threshold values of signatures within 333ms (as given in Table III) , without loss of generality, we evaluate the average verification cost for 64 ≤ n ≤ 512, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. It can be seen that the verification cost is a monotonically increasing concave function of variable k, which also shows that the verification cost will be smoothly increased with the increase of k. Moreover, to verify n signatures with k bogus ones, the basic scheme and ECDSA requires 2(n + 1)C par and 4nC mul , respectively, which are independent of k, whereas BAT approximately needs ((k+1)·log(n/k)+4k−2)C par +nC mul . Therefore, when the bogus message ratio exceeds a certain threshold (k/n ≈ 13% and k/n ≈ 27%, respectively), the performance of BAT will be inferior to the ECDSA scheme and the basic scheme, respectively.
In the scenario of severe DoS attacks, where the bogus message ratio is higher than the maximal threshold value, two optimized policies can be considered: 1) the RSU can switch the BAT algorithm to the basic sequential verification algorithm, when it detects that the bogus message ratio exceeds a given threshold value; 2) RSUs can classify all of the received messages according to different priorities, and then take precedence of processing the emergent messages, such as these safety-ware messages and important traffic information.
Besides the robustness and efficiency of verification, the BAT scheme also offers low communication overhead. Though the length of a signature in the BAT scheme is |α i | = 342bits or 42 bytes, which is approximately equal to that of the ECDSA scheme, the BAT scheme does not need any certificate to be sent along with the message, whereas the ECDSA scheme has to transit a certificate in the message, which is 125 bytes long according to the IEEE 1609.2 Standard.
C. Security Analysis
The BAT scheme can offer conventional security for vehicular communications, such as identity privacy, identity traceability, and message integrity, which will be verified as follows.
Identity Privacy: For any vehicle V i , its real identity ID i is protected with the pseudo identity P ID * i = {P ID i,k |k = 1, 2, ..., z}, which is computed as P ID In addition, since each message is signed with different pseudo identities randomly chosen from a pool of pseudo identities, the BAT scheme addresses the issue of privacy preservation in VANETs to a large extent.
Identity Traceability: Given a message M i , α i , where 
Therefore, the identity traceability is satisfied. Once a signature α i is in doubt, TA can trace the real identity ID i of the suspected vehicle from the message M i , α i .
Message Signature: Our basic signature scheme can be considered as a modified F. Hess's signature scheme [32] , by replacing E i =ê(P, P ) ri in Hess's scheme with E i = r i P . Considering the computation capacity of a vehicle, we eliminate the compex pairing operation E i =ê(P, P ) ri , which is performed at the signer end in Hess's scheme. The security of our basic signature scheme also relies on the Diffie-Hellman hard problem in the random oracle model. The security of this scheme can be proofed by using the similar approach in [32] .
Pair-wise Byzantine Attacks: In general, the batch verification may be exposed to a specific attack, called the pairwise byzantine attack [35] . To address this issue, in RSAbased batch verification, a small exponent test method is introduced in [30] to thwart the specific byzantine attack by multiplying each message with a random small coefficient, respectively. However, our identity-based batch verification scheme can efficiently tolerate such pair-wise byzantine attack, even without applying the aforementioned modification. Without loss of generality, consider that an adversary holds any two correct messages M i , α i (i = 1, 2), where α i = E i , F i . According to Eq. (7), for launching a successful pair-wise attack with two given messages M i , α i (i = 1, 2), it is required to provide two forged messages M 1 and M 2 satisfying h(
However, due to the one-way property of h (.), it is difficult to derive the two message M 1 and M 2 , even the adversary has the knowledge of secret signature key SK i .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a secure, robust and practical scheme, called BAT, has been proposed for V2I communications. The proposed BAT scheme can efficiently eliminate the performance bottleneck when verifying a large number of signatures within a rigorously required interval. It is well competent for such adverse scenario without severe bogus messages flooding attack. Theoretical analysis and simulation results have demonstrated that the BAT scheme is valid and practical in efficient signature verification and meets the security and the privacy requirements for V2I communications. We will further explore the efficient DoS-tolerant signature scheme for VANETs in our future work.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: We first prove the case for t ≤ 2 l . Assume that the t bogus signatures are randomly distributed in the left sub-tree and right sub-tree, respectively. ForC(l + 1, t), there are t + 1 combination forms {(0, t), (1, t − 1), ..., (t, 0)}. For form (j, t − j), let random variable X be the number of bogus signatures in left sub-tree, which follows a Binomial distribution P (X = j) = t j 1 2 
Since t j=0 P (X = j) = 1, the above equation can be further reduced tõ C(l + 1, t) = P (X = 0) C (l, 0) +C(l, t) + P (X = 1) C (l, 1) +C(l, t − 1) + ... + P (X = t) C (l, t) +C(l, 0) + 2.
Using Eq. (20), Eq. (8) is proofed. For 2 l < t ≤ 2 l+1 , Eq. (9) can be similarly derived.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: In the case ofC(i, 0) = 2, due to non-forged signatures in all the n signatures {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n }, the authenticity of {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n } can be verified by only executing Fast_Check(α 0,0 ), which only needs 2 pairing operations.
In the case ofC(i, 1) = 2(i + 1), there is only one forged signature, say α k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), in all signatures {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n }. The binary authentication algorithm needs searching a path from the root to the leaf node associated with signature α k , Considering that checking the authenticity of each inner-node needs 3 pairing operation, henceC(i, 1) = 2(i + 1).
As forC(h, k)(k ≥ 2), if all the k forged signatures are distributed in left and right sub-tree randomly, there are k + 1 combination forms, which are listed as {(0, k), (1, k − 1) , ..., (k, 0)}. Consider that k ≤ 2 h , using the result of case 1 in Lemma 1,C(h, k) can be derived similarly.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: Without loss of generality, let k = 2 i and n = 2 h . According to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we havẽ 
On the other hand, we havẽ
≥C(i, k) + 2 · (h − i + 1)
≥ 2 log(n/k) + 4k − 2.
Hence, we have the following inequality 2 log(n/k)+ 4k − 2 ≤C(h, k) ≤ 2k log(n/k)+ 4k − 2. (25)   <1,0>   <0,0>   <2,1>  <2,0>   <1,1>   <2,3>  <2,2>   <3,1>  <3,0>  <3,3>  <3,2>  <3,7>  <3,6>  <3, 
D. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: The worst computation complexity of pairing operations can be derived directly from Lemma 4. In fact, the upper boundary in the Lemma is also the worst case.
For the best case, it case can only occur when all the k fake signatures accumulate together, while authentic signatures assemble together also. 
Hence, for any k (2 j ≤ k ≤ 2 j+1 ), we have 2(2 log k − 1) + 2 log n/k ≤ C Best (h, k) ≤ 2(2 log k − 1) + 2 log n/k . (27) 
